Ransomware Has a New Target: Is Your Backup Really Ready?
Having a backup does not always mean you can recover.
For years, organizations have focused on preventing ransomware from entering their environments, detecting malicious activity, and protecting critical systems from data encryption.
But ransomware attacks are evolving.
Attackers are increasingly targeting something even more valuable than production data: the backup and recovery infrastructure itself.
By deleting recovery points, compromising backup systems, or gaining access to backup environments through stolen credentials, attackers can prevent organizations from restoring their systems after an attack.
When recovery is no longer possible, the pressure to pay a ransom can increase dramatically.
Recent ransomware incidents have demonstrated that backup infrastructure is no longer simply an IT support system. It has become a critical security asset that attackers actively seek to compromise.
Backup Is Your Safety Net — But Can Attackers Reach It?
Many organizations have multiple backup copies, sometimes across different locations.
But the most important questions are not simply:
“How many backups do we have?”
or
“Where are our backups stored?”
Organizations should also ask:
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Is the backup environment isolated from production systems?
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Who can access or delete backup data?
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Are the same administrator credentials used for production and backup systems?
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If an administrator account is compromised, can attackers access the backup environment?
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Are backup and disaster recovery systems protected by separate identities and access controls?
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Are backups immutable?
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When was the last successful restore test?
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Can critical systems be restored within the required Recovery Time Objective (RTO)?
Because a backup that attackers can delete may not be a backup that can protect your business.
When Ransomware Targets the Backup
Recent ransomware incidents show how attackers are increasingly incorporating backup destruction into their attack strategies.
ALPHV/BlackCat: Disrupting Business Recovery
In the 2024 Change Healthcare incident, the ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware group gained access through a remote access portal that did not have Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA).
The incident demonstrated the importance of properly protected and isolated recovery infrastructure.
UnitedHealth reported that approximately $22 million in ransom was paid, while the overall financial impact of the incident was estimated to reach approximately $1.6 billion.
The lesson is clear:
The ability to recover can be just as important as the ability to prevent an attack.
BlackMatter: Destroying Backups Before Encryption
BlackMatter ransomware operators have been reported to use compromised administrator credentials to locate backup data stores and backup appliances within targeted environments.
Once identified, attackers could delete or format backup resources before encrypting other systems.
This highlights a critical weakness:
If backup infrastructure shares the same network and security boundaries as production systems, compromising one environment can potentially expose the other.
Gunra: When Even Disaster Recovery Is Targeted
In 2026, joint guidance from CISA and the FBI highlighted incidents involving Gunra ransomware where attackers deleted backup and archived data from both primary data center and disaster recovery environments.
In some cases, compromised credentials provided access across multiple environments.
This demonstrates an important principle:
Storing backups in a different location does not automatically make them secure.
If the same credentials, access paths, or security controls are used across environments, attackers may still be able to compromise multiple recovery locations.
5 Critical Areas to Review in Your Backup Security Strategy
01 — Isolate Backup from Production
Backup infrastructure should not depend entirely on the same network and security boundaries as production systems.
If an attacker compromises production and can immediately move into the backup environment, your recovery capability may be at risk.
Organizations should consider:
The goal is simple:
A compromised production environment should not automatically mean a compromised backup environment.
02 — Protect Backup with Strong Identity Controls
Using the same administrator credentials across production, backup, and recovery environments creates unnecessary risk.
Organizations should consider implementing:
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Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)
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Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
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Privileged Access Management (PAM)
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Least Privilege
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Dedicated Backup Administration Accounts
A single compromised account should never provide unrestricted access to an organization's entire recovery infrastructure.
03 — Use Immutable Backup
Immutable Backup is one of the key defenses against ransomware-driven backup destruction.
Immutable backups are designed to prevent data from being modified or deleted during a defined retention period, even when attackers gain elevated privileges.
The concept is straightforward:
Backup → Immutable → Protected from Tampering → Recoverable
For modern organizations, immutability should be considered an important component of a ransomware-resilient backup strategy.
04 — Patch Backup Infrastructure
Backup servers and backup applications are still software and infrastructure.
They can contain vulnerabilities and can become targets for attackers.
Organizations should therefore include backup infrastructure in their regular:
Patch Management → Vulnerability Management → Security Monitoring
processes.
Backup systems should not be treated as an exception simply because their primary purpose is data protection.
05 — Test Restore, Not Just Backup
One of the most overlooked questions is:
“Can we actually restore?”
A system reporting:
Backup Completed Successfully
does not necessarily mean the organization can successfully recover from a ransomware attack.
A resilient recovery process should be regularly tested:
Backup → Restore → Validate → Resume Business Operations
Organizations should verify:
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How long does a full restore take?
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Which systems must be restored first?
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How much recent data can actually be recovered?
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Is there a secondary recovery copy?
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Can critical systems meet the required RTO?
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Can the business continue operating during recovery?
A backup that has never been tested is an assumption — not proof of recoverability.
From Backup to Cyber Resilience
Ransomware protection should not stop at:
“We have backups.”
Organizations need to move from a traditional Backup Strategy toward a broader Cyber Resilience Strategy.
A resilient organization should be prepared to:
Protect → Detect → Respond → Recover → Resume
The ultimate objective of backup is not simply to preserve copies of data.
It is to ensure that the organization can recover critical operations and continue doing business after a cyberattack.
7 Questions Every Organization Should Ask Today
Use these questions to assess whether your backup environment is truly ransomware-ready:
1. If ransomware compromises production, can attackers reach our backups?
2. Are the same credentials used across production, backup, and disaster recovery environments?
3. Are our critical backups immutable?
4. Can attackers delete or modify our recovery points?
5. Is MFA enforced for backup administration?
6. When was our last successful restore test?
7. If ransomware hits today, can we recover critical business services within our required RTO?
If the answers are unclear, it may be time to reassess your Backup, Disaster Recovery, and Cyber Resilience Strategy.
Backup Is Only Valuable When You Can Recover
Ransomware will continue to evolve, but one principle remains constant:
Organizations must prepare not only to prevent attacks, but also to recover when prevention fails.
A resilient backup strategy should be:
Protected. Isolated. Immutable. Tested. Recoverable.
Because when production systems are compromised, organizations do not simply need another copy of their data.
They need the ability to restore operations, minimize downtime, and keep the business running.
Building Cyber Resilience Beyond Backup
BigFish Technology provides Digital Risk Management and Cybersecurity Solutions designed to help organizations strengthen their security, resilience, and business continuity.
From Cybersecurity Solution Design, Implementation & Maintenance and Cybersecurity-as-a-Service to Data Protection, Backup & Recovery, Information Security Management, and Business Continuity Management, organizations can build a more resilient approach to protecting critical systems and data.
Because Backup is only the beginning.
True resilience means being able to recover — and keep your business running.
BigFish Technology Limited
Digital Risk Management & Cybersecurity Solution Provider
